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Patents, Industrial Designs, and
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Many incentive-based economic theories have been used to justify pat-
ent systems. One such theory holds that patents are necessary to incentivize
the creation of inventions. According to that theory, patents provide inven-
tors the right to exclude the use of their inventions, which enables them to
recoup their research and development costs. In the absence of patent protec-
tion, those inventors would not be able to recoup those costs.1 Another theory
emphasizes the need to incentivize disclosure of inventions to foster techno-
logical growth—specifically, without patents, inventors would choose to
keep their inventions as closely-held secrets, which would not allow others to
improve upon those inventions.2 A third theory focuses on incentivizing not
just the creation of inventions but also the commercialization of products and
methods that actualize or utilize inventions—in the absence of the right to
exclude, products and methods would not incorporate new technology be-
cause of various factors such as free-riding.3
Each theory has its flaws, but the economic benefits of adopting patent
systems exist for both developed and developing nations. Businesses have
less incentive to invest in economies that lack strong patent protection to
prevent copycats from undercutting profits.4 For developing nations in partic-
ular, patents foster economic growth by attracting foreign investment in man-
ufacturing, sales, and distribution networks,5 but they also support the
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1. CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 33 (3d ed. 2014).
2. Id. at 34.
3. Id.
4. See Jacob A. Schroeder, So Long As You Live Under My Roof, You’ll Live by
. . . Whose Rules?: Ending the Extraterritorial Application of Patent Law, 18
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 55, 69 (2009) (“Strong intellectual property protection
assures businesses and owners of IP that their investment in technology will be
free from piracy and theft.”).
5. Id. at 69.
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development of home grown, technology-based industries.6 Patent systems in
developing countries also attract investment in areas of research and develop-
ment related to technologies that would have unique use and benefits in those
countries.7
As a result of the benefits that patent law can provide in terms of incen-
tivizing the creation, disclosure, and use of technology both for developed
and developing nations—as well as the efficiencies that flow from having
similar patent laws around the world—for many years countries have sought
to develop and harmonize their patent laws. In 1996, the World Trade Organ-
ization (WTO) and, in particular, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), began to dictate the contours of international intellectual
property (IP) protection.8 The WTO’s efforts ultimately resulted in the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS), which sought to harmonize international IP law by establishing
minimum standards of IP protection for all WTO members.9
To build upon the foundation laid by TRIPS, one stated goal of the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)—the proposed international agreement
under consideration here—was to further harmonize IP law requirements in
its member nations.10 In this article, we discuss TPP Articles 18.37–18.46,
6. Id. (“[S]trong intellectual property protection makes developing nations more
attractive to foreign investors from developed nations, thus fostering economic
growth. Furthermore, strong intellectual property protection will encourage the
growth of high value, high wage industries built on intellectual property.”).
7. Kate H. Murashige, Harmonization of Patent Laws, 16 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 591,
595 (1994) (“If the developing country’s market represents a marginal profit
once the R&D is completed, only generic manufacturers may find it profitable
to continue operation beyond R&D. However, this approach inspires no interest
in R&D for products that would uniquely interest such countries.”).
8. GATT marked the first time that international IP law was decided by a trade
organization. Previously, these standards were set by the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) and earlier non-trade-related organizations. G.
GREGORY LETTERMAN, BASICS OF INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW 27, 30 (2001).
9. Id. at 9; see also PETER JOHN WILLIAMS, A HANDBOOK ON ACCESSION TO THE
WTO at 10 (2008), available at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/
cbt_course_e/c1s1p1_e.htm (“[T]he percentage of world trade accounted for by
Members of the organization has risen from 86.8 percent to 96.4 percent and
the percentage of GDP from 89.4 percent to 96.7 percent.”).
10. See TPP: Made in America, Intellectual Property, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REP., https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Chapter-Summary-Intellectual-
Property.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2018) (“This will promote high standards of
protection, safeguard U.S. exports and consumers against IP infringement, and
provide fair access to legal systems in the region to enforce those rights. Draw-
ing from and building on other bilateral and regional trade agreements . . . .”).
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which deal with so-called general patents (utility patents), and TPP Articles
18.55–18.56, which deal with industrial designs (e.g., design patents).
II. ANALYSIS
We have divided our analysis of the TPP into two parts. The first part
covers general patents (utility patents), and the second part covers industrial
designs (e.g., design patents).
A. General Patents
This section discusses Articles 18.37–18.46 of the TPP.
1. Article 18.37: Patentable Subject Matter
Paragraph 1 of Article 18.37 requires that, subject to some express ex-
ceptions, patents be made available “for any invention, whether a product or
process, in all fields of technology, provided that the invention is new, in-
volves an inventive step and is capable of industrial application.”11 A foot-
note clarifies that “inventive step” means “non-obvious” and “capable of
industrial application” means “useful,” with both elements being considered
from the viewpoint of a person having ordinary skill in the art.12 This para-
graph is identical to a provision in TRIPS13 and, given the footnote, aligns
with current U.S. patent law.14
Paragraph 2 requires, again subject to the rest of the Article, that signa-
tories make patents available “for inventions claimed as at least one of the
following: new uses of a known product, new methods of using a known
product, or new processes of using a known product.”15 Unlike Paragraph 1,
11. Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., art. 18.37, ¶ 1, Feb.
4, 2016, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-
partnership/tpp-full-text [hereinafter TPP].
12. Id. art. 18.37, ¶ 1 n.30.
13. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, pt. II,
§ 5, art. 27, ¶ 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay
Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994), https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_
e/27-trips.pdf [hereinafter TRIPS] (“[P]atents shall be available for any inven-
tions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that
they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial
application.”).
14. See 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 101–103 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-30).
15. TPP, supra note 11, art. 18.37, ¶ 2.
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this part of the TPP exceeds the former TRIPS requirements;16 it does, how-
ever, match current U.S. patent law.17
Consistent with TRIPS, Paragraph 3 permits a country to exclude cer-
tain inventions from patentability “to protect ordre public or morality, in-
cluding to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious
prejudice to nature or the environment.”18 A TPP country could possibly use
this exception to deny a wide variety of patents it considers culturally im-
moral.19 While U.S. patent law includes no such exception,20 the European
Patent Convention does.21 Due to its abstract nature, the European Patent
Office has found it necessary to rely on various legal tests to determine com-
pliance.22 Paragraph 3 also expressly identifies some specific things (certain
methods of treatment, animals, and biological processes) that may be ex-
cluded from patentability.23
16. See generally TRIPS, supra note 13.
17. 35 U.S.C.A. § 100(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-30) (defining a pro-
cess to include “a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, compo-
sition of matter, or material”).
18. TPP, supra note 11, art. 18.37, ¶ 3; see TRIPS, supra note 13, pt. II, § 5, art.
27, ¶ 2–3.
19. See TPP, supra note 11, art. 18.37, ¶ 3.
20. See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (stating that “the principle that inventions are invalid if they are princi-
pally designed to serve immoral or illegal purposes has not been applied
broadly in recent years”).
21. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, art. 53, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065
U.N.T.S. 199 (“European patents shall not be granted in respect of: (a)
[I]nventions the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to ‘or-
dre public’ or morality[.]”).
22. Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnol-
ogy in Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469, 519–24 (2003) (“Balancing
competing interests is not the only approach the EPO has taken when evaluat-
ing the applicability of the Article 53(a) exception. In two later cases, different
bodies within the EPO articulated two additional morality tests: (1) the unac-
ceptability test and (2) the public abhorrence test.”).
23. TPP, supra note 11, art. 18.37, ¶ 3 (“A Party may also exclude from patentabil-
ity . . . (a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of
humans or animals; [and] (b) animals other than microorganisms, and essen-
tially biological processes for the production of plants or animals, other than
non-biological and microbiological processes.”). Notably, U.S. patent law in-
cludes some analogous limitations on patent rights, albeit not always in the
context of patentability. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C.A. § 287(c) (Westlaw through Pub.
L. No. 115-30) (“With respect to a medical practitioner’s performance of a
medical activity that constitutes an infringement under Section 271(a) or (b),
the provisions of Sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 shall not apply against the
medical practitioner or against a related health care entity with respect to such
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Paragraph 4 allows for the exclusion of plant patents, but it does not
allow for the exclusion of patents for microorganisms or inventions derived
from plants.24
2. Article 18.38: Grace Period
When the United States recently transitioned from a first-to-invent to a
first-inventor-to-file patent system, it maintained a one-year grace period for
certain events, including public disclosures made by the inventor.25 The TPP
imports this approach, requiring each of its signatories to disregard a public
disclosure that: “(a) was made by the patent applicant or by a person that
obtained the information directly or indirectly from the patent applicant; and
(b) occurred within 12 months prior to the date of the filing of the application
in the territory of the Party.”26 Under this rule, the public disclosure cannot
be used to show a lack of novelty or inventive step.27 TRIPS contains no
corresponding requirement,28 and many TPP partner nations will need to up-
date their laws to comply with this new requirement.29 For example, Viet-
nam’s current grace period applies only to novelty determinations and is
limited to six months prior to filing.30 Proponents of the grace period argue
that allowing some flexibility for pre-filing disclosures permits inventors to
test and commercialize technology earlier, which helps to improve the qual-
ity of patent disclosures for successful technologies and eliminate unneces-
sary patent filing for unsuccessful technologies.31 The grace period also
avoids punishing inventors by eliminating patentability for honest mistakes.32
medical activity.”); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 33 (2011), https://
www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/bills-112hr1249enr.pdf (“Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, no patent may issue on a claim directed to or en-
compassing a human organism.”).
24. TPP, supra note 11, art. 18.37, ¶ 4.
25. 35 U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-30).
26. TPP, supra note 11, art. 18.38.
27. Id.
28. See TRIPS, supra note 13, pt. II, § 5, art. 29.
29. Jeremiah B. Frueaf & Matthew A. Smith, Public Disclosure Grace Periods and
the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Member States Seek Harmonization with the
America Invents Act, 91 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 1144, at 1 (2016).
30. VIETNAM CODE CIVIL, No. 50/2005/QH11, art. 60(3) (Viet.) (Law on Intellec-
tual Property).
31. William G. Giltinan, The Disclosure Function, Academic/Private Partnerships,
and the Case for Affirmatively Used, Multinational Grace Periods, 22 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 109, 111–12 (2014). Those who disfavor the grace period
argue that it “contribute[s] to legal uncertainty, promote[s] sloppy practice, and
can be abused to gain unwarranted patent term extensions.” Id.
32. Id.
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Further, TPP advocates point out that extending the grace period to all signa-
tories will benefit applicants currently burdened by disparate systems, and
they argue it may even encourage the European Patent Organization to fol-
low suit to further eliminate differences between countries.33
3. Article 18.39: Patent Revocation
Each TPP signatory must provide that “a patent may be cancelled, re-
voked or nullified only on grounds that would have justified a refusal to grant
the patent.”34 Outside of litigation, patent revocation may be accomplished
through administrative proceedings similar to the ones created by the United
State in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.35 In the United States, Inter
Partes Review (IPR) proceedings, which are the most popular,36 allow for
challenges for lack of novelty or non-obviousness on the basis of prior pat-
ents and printed publications.37
The TPP holds that a member state “may also provide that fraud, mis-
representation or inequitable conduct may be the basis for cancelling, revok-
ing or nullifying a patent or holding a patent unenforceable.”38 This provision
33. See Frueaf & Smith, supra note 29, at 5; U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement: Likely Impact on the U.S. Economy and on
Specific Industry Sectors 472 (2016), https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/
pub4607.pdf; INDUS. TRADE ADVISORY COMM. ON INTELL. PROP. RTS., THE
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 12 (2015), https://ustr.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/ITAC-15-Intellectual-Property.pdf. The European Patent Organiza-
tion currently utilizes a strict approach to the grace period. See Giltinan, supra
note 31, at 116 (“Under this system, all public disclosure, including that from
the inventor, is treated as prior art. The only exceptions are disclosures arising
from wrongdoing at the expense of the applicant and disclosures at a very lim-
ited number of international exhibitions. Those exceptions only apply to disclo-
sures occurring no more than six months prior to the filing of the European
application.”).
34. TPP, supra note 11, art. 18.39.
35. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act §§ 6, 18 (2011), https://www.uspto.gov/
aia_implementation/bills-112hr1249enr.pdf.
36. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
STATISTICS 7/31/2016 (2016), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/docu-
ments/2016-07-31%20PTAB.pdf. Post-Grant Review and Covered Business
Method proceedings also exist, but they have narrower application and are less
frequently used. Id. Anyone other than the patent owner who has not previously
filed a civil action challenging the patent’s validity, and has not been served
with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent more than one year prior
to the date in question, may petition for institution of an IPR. 35 U.S.C.A.
§ 315 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-30).
37. 35 U.S.C.A. § 311 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-30). If there is a reasona-
ble likelihood that the petitioner is correct, a proceeding is instituted. Id.
38. TPP, supra note 11, art. 18.39, ¶ 1.
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aligns with U.S. patent law, which punishes inequitable conduct with unen-
forceability of the entire patent and any related, tainted patents.39 Due to the
severe nature of the punishment for such conduct, U.S. law requires clear and
convincing evidence that (1) the patentee specifically intended to deceive the
patent examiner; and (2) the patent office would not have granted the patent
if the deception had not occurred.40
Furthermore, the TPP allows for the revocation of a patent “in a manner
consistent with Article 5A of the Paris Convention and the TRIPS Agree-
ment.”41 The applicable TRIPS provisions are relatively sparse, providing
little structure other than requiring that the procedures be “fair and equitable”
and allowing for judicial review.42 On the other hand, Article 5A of the Paris
Convention permits a member to grant compulsory licenses for patentee
“abuses,” such as the failure to work a patent.43 It further holds that the patent
may be revoked if two years of compulsory licensing is an inadequate rem-
edy for the abuses.44
4. Article 18.40: Exceptions
The TPP allows for “limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred
by a patent.”45 Like its sister provision in TRIPS,46 however, the exceptions
cannot unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent or un-
reasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner.47 A state
might decide to apply this exception for social reasons, research reasons,
public interest reasons, public health reasons, or legal reasons.48
39. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (stating that “the remedy for inequitable conduct is the ‘atomic
bomb’ of patent law”).
40. See id. at 1290–91.
41. TPP, supra note 11, art. 18.39, ¶ 2.
42. TRIPS, supra note 13, pt. II, § 5, art. 32; pt. III, § 1, art. 41 ¶ 2–3; pt. III, § 5,
art. 62 ¶ 4–5.
43. The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 5A(2), July
14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583.
44. Id. art. 5A(3). This working requirement is a European concept that was re-
jected in the United States over a century ago. See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E.
Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908); see also generally Harold C. Wegner,
Injunctive Relief: A Charming Betsy Boomerang, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 156 (2006).
45. TPP, supra note 11, art. 18.40.
46. See TRIPS, supra note 13, pt. II § 1, art. 13.
47. TPP, supra note 11, art. 18.40.
48. See Catherine Margellou, Intellectual Property & Medical Innovation Chal-
lenges for the Future: Patent Exceptions and Limitations in the Health Context,
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5. Article 18.41: Other Use without Authorization of the Right
Holder
Article 18.41 clarifies that nothing in the relevant chapter of the TPP
“limits a Party’s rights and obligations under Article 31 of the TRIPS Agree-
ment, any waiver or any amendment to that Article that the Parties accept.”49
The article sets out many restrictions for the use of a patented technology
absent the patentee’s permission.50
6. Article 18.42: Patent Filing
In the event that two parties independently create an invention and file
separate patent applications, the patent must be granted to the party with the
earliest filing date or priority date, so long as that party’s application is pat-
entable and not withdrawn, abandoned, or refused.51 Two footnotes provide
clarifying explanations, including that exceptions may be made for deriva-
tions and when “an earlier application . . . is not prior art against the subse-
quent application.”52 There was no corresponding requirement under TRIPS
to award the patent to the first inventor to file, but this article aligns with
U.S. law after the America Invents Act.53
7. Article 18.43: Amendments, Corrections and Observations
In another departure from TRIPS, Article 18.43 requires an applicant to
be provided with “at least one opportunity to make amendments, corrections
and observations in connection with its application.”54 A footnote clarifies
that any such amendment may be restricted such that it does not result in the
addition of new material beyond the scope of the originally filed disclosure,
which is consistent with the new matter doctrine used in U.S. patent law.55
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/m
docs/mdocs/en/wipo_ip_ath_14/wipo_ip_ath_14_p5.pdf.
49. TPP, supra note 11, art. 18.41.
50. TRIPS, supra note 13, pt. II, § 5, art. 31. These restrictions include requiring
adequate remuneration to the patent holder, the availability of judicial or other
independent review, and non-exclusive and non-assignable use. Id.
51. TPP, supra note 11, art. 18.42.
52. Id. art. 18.42 nn.33–34.
53. Compare id. art. 18.42 n.33–34, with 35 U.S.C.A. § 102 (Westlaw through
Pub. L. No. 115-30).
54. TPP, supra note 11, art. 18.43.
55. Id. art. 18.43 n.35; see, e.g., Glaxo Wellcome, Inc. v. Impax Labs., Inc., 356
F.3d 1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The new matter doctrine prevents an appli-
cant from adding new subject matter to the claims unless the specification
shows that the inventor had support for the addition at the time of the original
filing.”).
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8. Article 18.44: Publication of Patent Applications
Citing the “benefits of transparency in the patent system,” the TPP re-
quires signatories to endeavor to publish pending patent applications
promptly after the expiration of 18 months from the filing date or, if applica-
ble, the earliest priority date.56 Alternatively, an applicant may request earlier
publication.57 While not a requirement of TRIPS, the 18-month publication
rule is a feature of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT).58
9. Article 18.45: Information Relating to Published Patent
Applications and Granted Patents
With respect to granted patents and published patent applications, the
TPP requires signatories to make available to the public search and examina-
tion results (including relevant prior art searches), non-confidential commu-
nications from applicants, and literature citations submitted by applicants and
third parties.59
10. Article 18.46: Patent Term Adjustment for Patent Office
Delays
While largely overshadowed by the patent term extensions that compen-
sate for delays in receiving marketing approval for pharmaceuticals,60 which
is a subject outside the scope of this article, the TPP also requires member
states to adjust patent terms for “unreasonable delays in a Party’s issuance of
patents.”61 An unreasonable delay must, at a minimum, include “a delay in
the issuance of a patent of more than five years from the date of filing of the
application in the territory of the Party, or three years after a request for
examination of the application has been made, whichever is later.”62
When the United States altered its patent term to become compliant with
TRIPS, it implemented a patent term adjustment provision.63 Since the expi-
ration date of U.S. patents is set to twenty years from the effective filing date
(instead of seventeen years from the date of the grant), patent owners must be
compensated for the loss of patent term resulting from patent office delays.64
56. TPP, supra note 11, art. 18.44, ¶ 1.
57. Id. art. 18.44, ¶ 3.
58. Patent Cooperation Treaty, art. 21, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160
U.N.T.S. 231, http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/articles/atoc.htm.
59. TPP, supra note 11, art. 18.45.
60. See id. art. 18.48.
61. Id. art. 18.46, ¶ 3.
62. Id. art. 18.46, ¶ 4.
63. 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-30); TRIPS, supra
note 13, pt. II, § 5, art. 33.
64. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-30).
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Thus, if Vietnamese patent law, for example, currently provides no adjust-
ment for patent office delays, it would need to be updated to become TPP
compliant. Notably, besides requiring signatories make best efforts to process
patent applications to avoid unreasonable or unnecessary delays,65 the TPP
requires that signatories provide procedures for patent applicants to request
expedited examination of their patent applications.66
B. Industrial Designs
This section discusses Articles 18.55–18.56 of the TPP.
1. Article 18.55: Protection
The TPP requires “adequate and effective protection of industrial de-
signs.”67 This protection must extend to designs “embodied in a part of an
article” or “having a particular regard, where appropriate, to a part of an
article in the context of the article as a whole.”68 Except for this new require-
ment to protect a part of an article, the TPP adopts the existing industrial
design standards of TRIPS Articles 25 and 26.69
2. Article 18.56: Improving Industrial Design Systems
Article 18.56 highlights the parties’ recognition of the importance of
improving the quality and efficiency of industrial design registration systems,
including allowing cross-border acquisition of rights.70 Without requiring its
adoption, the TPP states that members must give “due consideration to ratify-
ing or acceding to the Geneva Act of the Hague Agreement Concerning the
International Registration of Industrial Designs.”71 The Geneva Act is the
latest addition to the Hague Agreement, which represents an international
registration system for industrial designs and allows for protection in multi-
ple countries with minimal formalities.72
65. TPP, supra note 11, art. 18.46, ¶ 1.
66. Id. art. 18.46, ¶ 2.
67. Id. art. 18.55, ¶ 1.
68. Id.
69. Id. art. 18.55, ¶ 2 (“This Article is subject to Article 25 and Article 26 of the
TRIPS Agreement.”); see TRIPS, supra note 12, pt. II, § 4, art. 25–26 (outlin-
ing the requirements for protection of industrial designs).
70. TPP, supra note 11, art. 18.56.
71. Id. art. 18.56. Of the TPP signatories, only the United States, Japan, Singapore,
and Brunei have adopted the Geneva Act. See WIPO-Administered Treaties:
Geneva Act (1999), WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/
treaties/en/ActResults.jsp ?act_id=7 (last visited Jan. 24, 2018).
72. Hague Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Industrial De-
signs, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/regis
tration/hague (last visited Jan. 24, 2018).
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III. CONCLUSION
This article summarizes, at a high level, certain provisions of the TPP
related to the law governing utility and design patents. It also highlights some
of the similarities and differences between the TPP, on the one hand, and
U.S. patent law, Vietnamese patent law, the PCT, and TRIPS, on the other
hand.
